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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
accordance with statutory procedure. Because it was the last day
of the license period, and the record wouldn't be ready for at
least three more days, the Liquor Authority, in making the
revocation, proceeded on some "notes" prepared by the hearing
commissioner from memory. The revocation was affirmed by the
Appellate Division.2 The Court of Appeals reversed, pointing
out that even though the actual report may have contained sub-
stantially the same facts as were given to the Liquor Authority
in the "notes", and even though the decision may have been the
same, the fact remains that the Liquor Authority cannot wholly
disregard procedural methods set up in the statute and regulations.
From the decision of this case it is clear that administrative
action will not be upheld, regardless of the propriety of the
decision, when the procedure set out in the statute, or regulations
adopted pursuant thereto, has not been closely adhered to. In
Wignall v. Fleher, discussed above, the Court of Appeals held
that administrative tribunals, like judicial tribunals, are bound
to proceed in a manner consistent with the requirements of due
process. An agency. may have express authority to conduct a
proceeding against an individual and to invoke the prescribed
sanctions; however, it may not do so without proper notice to the
individual involved. Such notice includes the requirement that
a person be duly informed whenever there is any change in the
nature of the proceeding against him.
Exhaustion of Remedies
The doctrine referred to as "exhaustion of remedies" stands
for the proposition that before litigants may take their cases to
the courts, they must first exhaust the administrative remedies
available.3 3 Even though a case has been before an agency, and
a determination has been secured therefrom, the doctrine requires
that the whole administrative process be utilized.84 If there is
further process or appeal possible before an agency, the courts will
not assume jurisdiction to review, even though the determination
of which review is sought was made by an administrative
tribunal. 5
A "jurisdictional dispute" between the Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen and the Switchmen 's Union involved the inter-
32. 278 App. Div. 917, 195 N. Y. S. 2d 909 (lst Dep't 1951).
33. Aircraft & Diesel Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U. S. 752 (1947).
34. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938).
35. Ibid.
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pretation of agreements which the two unions had with the same
employer, the Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. Each union contended
that its contract allowed it to assign men to certain jobs.
Jurisdiction over "disputes between an employee or group of
'employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or
out of the interpretation or application of agreements" is vested
in the National Railway Adjustment Board by the Railway Labor
Act.80 And the Supreme Court of the United States held in
Slocam v. Dela zre, L. & W. R. Co.8 7 that such jurisdiction is
"exclusive jurisdiction." Thus, parties cannot go to the courts
with disputes described in the act, without having first proceeded
before the Railway Adjustment Board.
In the instant case,88 the parties first went to the Board, but
the Board "dismissed" the claim, on what ground does not appear.
Thus, the parties were left to further negotiations. Such nego-
tiations having failed, the plaintiff union sued to enjoin the other
union from assigning men to the jobs in question and sought a
declaration of their respective rights under the contracts. Defend-
ant union counter-claimed for the same relief. Supreme Court,
Erie County, entered a judgiment in favor of plaintiff union."
The Appellate Division, fourth department, reversed and dismissed
the complaint and counter-claim."
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division41 on the
ground that there was no jurisdiction in the lower court to hear
the ease, since the jurisdiction of the Railway Adjustment Board
over such disputes is "exclusive." This decision does not, how-
ever, constitute a determination that the "exclusive jurisdiction"
of the Board means that the courts may never take jurisdiction
of such a case, even to review the Board. The court made clear
the point that its holding is based on the fact that the determina-
tion of the Railwav Adjustment Board was not a final adjudication
on the merits. What the case holds. in effect, is that parties to
a dispute which falls within the jurisdiction of the Railway
Adjustment Board must first proceed to a final determination
before the Board. and then go to the courts for a review of such
determination. They may not zet an initial determination on the
merits in the courts, even though the Board has once "dismissed"
the case.
36. 45 U. S. C. § 153, ubd. 1 0i).
37. 339 U. S. 239 (1950).
38. Brennan v. Delaware, L. & TV. R. Co., 303 N. Y. 411, 105 N. E. 2d 532 (1952).
39. 91 N. Y. S. 2d 376 (Sup. Ct 1949).
40. 278 App. Div. 886, 105 N. Y. S. 2a 368 (4th Dep't 1951).
41. Supra n. 38.
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Apparently, what the parties should do in order to settle
their dispute, if further negotiations between them fail, is to return
to the Railway Adjustment Board and seek a determination on
the merits. Under the instant case, such a determination would
be reviewable in tle courts. If the Board does not render a final
determination, but again dismisses the proceeding, the parties
should bring an action, in the nature of mandamus, to compel the
Railway Adjustment Board to render a decision on the merits of
this case.
, udicial Review
The basic problem of judicial review of administrative action
is: to what extent should a court go into the record of the agency?
Only recently has the federal rule on the problem been clarified.4 -
In New York State, judicial review of administrative action is
conducted under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Act.43 The issues
that the court must determine are: "whether there was any com-
petent proof of all the facts necessary to be proved in order to
authorize the making of the determination, '44 and if "there was
such proof, whether upon all the evidence there was such a pre-
ponderance of proof against the existence of any of those facts
that the verdict of a jury, affirming the existence thereof, rendered
in an action in the supreme court triable by a jury, would be set
aside by a court as against the weight of evidence." 
4
As viewed by the courts, the statutory requirement for
upholding a determination of an agency is that there be "substan-
tial evidence" to support such determination.6 The evidence is
to be viewed in the light of the record as a whole,47 and if the
reviewing court concludes that others might reasonably have
reached the same result as the agency, the determination should
be upheld.4 8  These rules were neither originally laid down nor
changed in the past term, but they were reiterated and explained.49
42. Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U. S. 474 (1951).
43. §§ 1283-1306.
44. C. P. A. § 1296 subd. 6.
45. C. P. A. § 1296 subd. 7.
46. Lynch Builders Restaurant v. O'Connell, 303 X. Y. 408, 103 N. E. 2d 531
(1952).
47. McCormack v. National City Bank, 303 N. Y. 5, 99 N. E. 24 887 (1951).
48. Kopec v. Buffalo Brake Beam-Acme Steel & Malleable Iron Works ,supra n. 5.
49. Ibid.
